Liquidity Providers Reward Programme

$\delta_i^{bid}$, $\delta_j^{ask}$ measures the proportional length of time the bid/ask order has remained live over the epoch.

For each strike, expiry and call put product $K, T, CP$ the following quantities are computed over the time length of the entire epoch:

$\small{Q^{}_{Bid}(K,T,CP) = \delta_1^{bid}\frac{BidDepth_1}{SprBid1} +\delta_2^{bid}\frac{BidDepth_2}{SprBid2}+}...$

$\small{Q^{}_{Ask}(K,T,CP) = \delta_1^{ask}\frac{AskDepth_1}{SprAsk1} +\delta_2^{ask}\frac{AskDepth_2}{SprAsk2}+}...$

$\small{Q_{MIN}^{}(K,T,CP) = MIN(Q_{Ask}^{},Q_{Bid}^{})}$

$\small{Q^h_{step1} = \sum_{CP}\sum_{T}\sum_K Q_{MIN}(K,T,CP) }$

$\small{UpTime^h_{epoch}} = \Delta(Q^h_{step1})$ Where $\Delta$ represents the fraction of time over the epoch when the liquidity provider has placed some meaningful two-way liquidity. Notice, PowerTrade measures time with nanosecond precision.

$\pi_{epoch}^h = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^m V^h(i)}{TVT}$

Where TVT = Total Volume Traded over the period for all options, $\pi_{epoch}^h$ represents the portion of traded volume that the market-maker $h$ has won over the period in volume terms (m are the total trades that the market-maker has filled).

$\bold 1_{Min Maker Volume}\small{(h)}=1$ if $\pi_{epoch}^h >minMaker$

else, $\bold 1_{Min Maker Volume}\small{(h)}=0$

$\Big( \Delta(Q^h_{step1}) > 0.75\Big)$

then $\bold 1_{Min UpTimeDay}\small{(h)}=1$ else $\bold 1_{Min UpTimeDay}\small{(h)}=0$

Finally, all these quantities are put together in order to form another intermediary step in the calculations for the final score of each individual market-maker $h$:

If the total liquidity rewards for Options in PB for the epoch is $R_{options}$, the individual market-maker reward is:

Total depth over spread of two way liquidity at every nano-second are recorded at each Futures expiry $T$: $\small{Q(fut)^{}_{Bid}(T) = \delta_1^{bid}\frac{BidDepth_1}{SprBid1} +\delta_2^{bid}\frac{BidDepth_2}{SprBid2}+}$ $\small{Q(fut)^{}_{Ask}(T) = \delta_1^{ask}\frac{AskDepth_1}{Spr1} +\delta_2^{ask}\frac{AskDepth_2}{Spr2}+}$

$\small{Q(fut)_{MIN}^{}(T) = MIN(Q(fut)_{Ask}^{min},Q(fut)_{Bid}^{min})}$

$\small{Q^h_{step1}(fut) = \sum_{T}Q(fut)_{MIN}(T) }$

Rewards liquidity providers who provide most uptime liquidity over the period, with a minimum required of up-time: if less than 75% of the time per day, excluded from reward programme (see below): $\small{UpTime^h_{epoch}} = \Delta(Q^h_{step1}(fut))$ Where $\Delta$ represents the fraction of time over the epoch when the liquidity provider has placed some meaningful two-way liquidity. Notice, PowerTrade measures time with nanosecond precision.

Maker Volume: $\pi_{period}^h = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^m V^h(i)}{TVT}$

Where TVT = Total Volume Traded over the period for all futures, $\pi_{epoch}^h$ represents the portion of traded volume that the liquidity provider $h$ has won over the period in volume terms.

$\bold 1_{Min Maker Volume}\small{(h)}=1$ if $\pi_{epoch}^h >minMaker$

else, $\bold 1_{Min Maker Volume}\small{(h)}=0$

Minimum up-time is 75% over the epoch: This is measured as follows. If: $\Big( \Delta(Q^h_{step1}(fut)) > 0.75\Big)$ then $\bold 1_{Min UpTimeDay}\small{(h)}=1$ else $\bold 1_{Min UpTimeDay}\small{(h)}=0$

Finally, all these quantities are put together in order to form another intermediary step in the calculations for the final score of each individual market-maker $h$:

Total depth over spread of two way liquidity at every nano-second $\small{Q(spot)^{}_{Bid} = \delta_1^{bid}\frac{BidDepth_1}{SprBid1} +\delta_2^{bid}\frac{BidDepth_2}{SprBid2}+}$

$\small{Q(spot)_{Ask}^{} = \delta_1^{ask}\frac{AskDepth_1}{SprAsk1} +\delta_2^{ask}\frac{AskDepth_2}{SprAsk2}+}$

$\small{Q(spot)_{MIN}^{} = MIN(Q_{Ask}(spot),Q_{Bid}(spot))}$ $\small{Q^h_{step1} (spot)= Q(spot)_{MIN} }$

$\small{UpTime^h_{epoch}} = \Delta(Q^h_{step1}(spot))$ Where $\Delta$ represents the fraction of time over the epoch when the liquidity provider has placed some meaningful two-way liquidity . Notice, PowerTrade measures time with nanosecond precision.

$\pi_{period}^h = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^m V^h(i)}{TVT}$

Where TVT = Total Volume Traded over the period for all spot trades, $\pi_{epoch}^h$ represents the portion of traded volume that the liquidity provider $h$ has won over the period in volume terms.

$\bold 1_{Min Maker Volume}\small{(h)}=1$ if $\pi_{epoch}^h >minMaker$

else, $\bold 1_{Min Maker Volume}\small{(h)}=0$

Minimum up-time is 75% over the epoch: This is measured as follows. If: $\Big( \Delta(Q^h_{step1}(spot)) > 0.75\Big)$ then $\bold 1_{Min UpTimeDay}\small{(h)}=1$ else $\bold 1_{Min UpTimeDay}\small{(h)}=0$

Finally, all these quantities are put together in order to form another intermediary step in the calculations for the final score of each individual market-maker $h$:

If the total liquidity rewards for Spot in PB for the epoch is $R_{spot}$, the individual market-maker reward is:

Total depth over spread of two way liquidity at every nano-second $\small{Q(perps)^{}_{Bid} = \delta_1^{bid}\frac{BidDepth_1}{SprBid1} +\delta_2^{bid}\frac{BidDepth_2}{SprBid2}+}$ $\small{Q(perps)^{}_{Ask} = \delta_1^{ask}\frac{AskDepth_1}{Spr1} +\delta_2^{ask}\frac{AskDepth_2}{Spr2}+}$

$\small{Q(perps)_{MIN}^{} = MIN(Q(perps)_{Ask},Q(perps)_{Bid})}$

$\small{Q)^h_{step1}(perps) = Q(perps)_{MIN}}$

$\small{UpTime^h_{epoch}} = \Delta(Q^h_{step1}(perps))$

Where $\Delta$ represents the fraction of time over the epoch when the liquidity provider has placed some meaningful two-way liquidity . Notice, PowerTrade measures time with nanosecond precision.

$\pi_{period}^h = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^m V^h(i)}{TVT}$

Where TVT = Total Volume Traded over the period for all spot trades, $\pi_{epoch}^h$ represents the portion of traded volume that the liquidity provider $h$ has won over the period in volume terms.

$\bold 1_{Min Maker Volume}\small{(h)}=1$ if $\pi_{epoch}^h >minMaker$

else, $\bold 1_{Min Maker Volume}\small{(h)}=0$

Minimum up-time is 75% over the epoch: This is measured as follows. If: $\Big( \Delta(Q^h_{step1}(perps)) > 0.75\Big)$ then $\bold 1_{Min UpTimeDay}\small{(h)}=1$ else $\bold 1_{Min UpTimeDay}\small{(h)}=0$

Finally, all these quantities are put together in order to form another intermediary step in the calculations for the final score of each individual market-maker $h$:

If the total liquidity rewards for Perps in PB for the epoch is $R_{perps}$, the individual market-maker reward is: